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Introduction: The Argument
The end of the Cold War was also the end of global or world order as we knew it: a bipolar standoff between two superpowers and their respective allies. The dissolution of the Soviet Union effectively terminated that order and gave way to-what exactly? It was certainly not clear at the time; surprisingly, it is not clear today, more than a quarter of a century later. The first reaction, understandably, was one of liberal optimism; if anything, the events marked the unabashed victory of political and economic liberalism. Liberal democracy and the liberal market economy would now encompass the whole world and peace, cooperation, security, order, common values, welfare and even the good life for all would eventually follow (Fukuyama 1989 (Fukuyama , 1992 .
The next reaction was much more pessimistic and sceptical; it came early in the 1990s even though that decade was a liberal honeymoon period of high hopes. Realist scholars predicted that old friends would get at each other's throats now that the common enemy was gone (Mearsheimer 1991) . At the same time, liberal hubris would produce an arrogant form of liberal universalism which amounted to imperialism. Such behaviour would help produce a clash of civilizations and, increasingly, future conflicts would appear at the fault lines of civilizations (Huntington 1993 (Huntington , 1996 . The central division would be between the Western states, on one hand, and the Islamic and Confucian states-cum-civilizations, on the other.
Liberal optimism was not to be frustrated; an analysis from the late 1990s argued that ever more sophisticated economies would need to enter into ever closer networks of cooperation. Nation states would remain major units in international politics but would be compelled to cooperate in order to provide a protective umbrella for a globalized economy (Rosecrance 1999).
Then September 11, 2001 , transformed the international agenda. The leading country, the United States, embarked on a global war on terror which led to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. International terrorism became a major security issue. Later in that decade, it emerged that the globalized market economy was not the rocksolid foundation for a cooperating world which some liberals had made it out to be. The financial crisis that broke in 2008 disturbed the entire economic system, even though it was the established capitalist economies in North America and Western Europe that were hit the worst. The world economy did not break down completely, but maybe the crisis is not over. It was sufficiently serious so as to provoke a debate about the appropriate capitalist model for the system, especially about the proper relationship between free market forces and political regulation.
At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Time Magazine pronounced the 2000s a 'decade from hell'; the 'most dispiriting' years Americans had lived through since World War II (Serwer 2009). Sceptics repeated their message: the end of history had been replaced by the return of history. Aggressive rivalry among great powers had not gone away but had instead intensified, especially between liberal and autocratic states, in the context of the re-emergence of a struggle among radical Islamists and modern secular cultures and powers (Kagan 2007) .
Liberal optimists continued to disagree. One liberal observer introduced a theory of convergence which argued that significant forces were driving humanity closer together, towards creating one world of global citizens. Economic globalization, technological change, common material aspirations and the environmental hazards that threaten us all are the major factors in this process of global convergence (Mahbubani 2013) .
Several other observers, with a variety of theoretical orientations, have made contributions to the debate about world order. I introduce them in due course. In spite of the divergence of views, I shall argue that the division between liberal optimists and sceptical realists is the major fault line in the world order debate. Liberal optimists look to processes of cooperation, convergence and shared values in an increasingly liberal world; sceptical realists emphasize conflict, divergence and the lack of shared values in a context of rivalry and competition. Additional contributions can be considered in relation to this primary disagreement.
The debate between liberal optimists and sceptical realists will surely continue. Real-world developments keep throwing up new events that point in one or the other direction. But it is a relevant time for stocktaking: a dozen years of liberal hopefulness after the end of the Cold War have been followed by a dozen years of new security threats, an abundance of violent conflict and a severe economic crisis. So where exactly are we today as regards world order? That is the question pursued in this book. I shall argue that both liberal optimists and sceptical realists make valid points but both also have significant shortcomings.
World order is a contested concept; I introduce it in detail in due course, a brief definition will suffice here. On one hand, world order is a governing arrangement among states, with the participation of other actors. That is the international dimension. On the other hand, world order also has a domestic dimension, which is about major aspects of socio-political conditions within states. Many sceptics share a view of world order as a 'thin' order where competition and rivalry among or within states always threaten violent conflict. Many optimists share a view of world order as a 'thick' order where the 'good life' is increasingly available to all people.
I begin with a presentation of the major contributions to the debate about world order (Chapter 1); that sets the context for my own analysis. The following chapters (2, 3 and 4) set forth the framework conditions that make up the context for the current world order. Chapter 2 is about domestic conditions within major types of state in the present system. I make the claim that we live in a world where all states are increasingly fragile. The term 'fragile states' has been used to signify the weak, post-colonial states in the Global South with frail economies, corrupt and ineffective political systems and a lack of national community. But both modernizing states, such as Brazil, India and China, and the so-called advanced states in Western Europe, North America and East Asia are increasingly characterized by fragility as well. Their political systems are less effective and sometimes corrupt; state capacity is also threatened because these states are less socially embedded and intense participation in economic globalization undercuts their room for manoeuver. National community is weakening also, under pressure from socio-economic inequality and patterns of migration. All this has consequences for world order because it affects the international roles that states and societies can play.
The fragility of states is bad for citizens, of course. It reduces the possibilities of living the 'good life' where security, order, justice, welfare and freedom are values that most people can enjoy. The situation is most serious in the very fragile states in the Global South because they must permanently live with insecurity and violent conflict. But there are also problems in many other states. They concern, among other things, the environment, health, economic inequality and personal security. That is a destabilizing element in the present world order.
Chapter 3 turns to international conditions with a focus on relations between states. I demonstrate that the traditional security dilemma of imminent war among sovereign states is much less pertinent in today's order. Liberals have a point: there is a 'democratic peace' among consolidated democracies; furthermore, even non-democratic states want to participate in economic globalization and in international institutions. Together with other developments, this means that traditional interstate war is in sharp decline. That important point is often overlooked because there is still a large amount of violent conflict in the world.
The decline of interstate war and the fragility of states are two major framework conditions in relation to world order. A third framework condition is discussed in Chapter 4; it concerns the power structure of the present system. It is argued that in terms of material power, the United States remains the most powerful country in the present order. But there is also a social side to power which concerns the ability to create and sustain a legitimate order; in this area the United States faces significant problems. Its dominant material power is not sufficient on its own to establish a stable and effective order and no other great power, or coalition of powers, is capable or ready to take on that task.
So the framework conditions point in different directions. On one hand, increasingly fragile states are less able and willing to create and sustain an effective and legitimate order. On the other hand, the decreasing importance of interstate war should improve the prospects for a robust world order. In material power terms, the United States and Western countries remain strong; the question is whether they are capable and willing to take the lead in establishing an effective and legitimate world order.
Given these three framework conditions, Chapters 5 through 8 examine patterns of world order in major areas of concern. Four Copyrighted material -9781137483249
Copyrighted material -9781137483249 sectors are analysed in detail: security, economics, institutions and values. Chapter 5 discusses the three dominant items on the security agenda: fragile states, great power rivalry and competition in different regions, and human security. The chapter concludes that we are headed towards increasing crisis and instability.
Chapter 6 is about economics and the shifting dynamics of globalization. The liberal expectation of convergence and cooperation in the economic field has to some extent been proven correct, but economic globalization is also highly uneven and there are strong limits to convergence. That creates backlashes against globalization and intensified cooperation.
Chapter 7 investigates international institutions and the current status of global governance. Is it 'good-enough governance' or is it a case of gridlock? The chapter argues that it is piecemeal governance in the sense that a great amount of governance is supplied but it does not provide solutions that go beyond short-term crisis management.
Finally, Chapter 8 is about the standing of liberal values in the present order. The chapter posits a tension between two basic liberal values: the value of independence versus the value of interdependence. A move towards intensified interdependence has characterized the period since the end of the Cold War, but presently, the pendulum swings the other way: towards more emphasis on independence. That does not improve the conditions for establishing an effective world order.
In overall conclusion, liberals have a point in diagnosing substantial liberal progress after the end of the Cold War. But they seriously underestimate the tensions and contradictions built into the process. On one hand, the transformations inside and among countries throw up a host of problems that liberals tend to assume away; on the other hand, serious tensions between liberal values, such as the tension between independence and interdependence, are built into the current world order. As a result, destructive dynamics may prevail over constructive dynamics, not because realists are right about the omnipresence of conflict and rivalry in any world order, but because current domestic and international conditions impede the kind of progress that liberals tend to take for granted.
At the very moment when world order is more liberal than it ever was, both the economic and the political dimension of liberal order are in crisis. The liberal market economy is increasingly unequal and its financial infrastructure remains fragile and crisis-prone. There is a comprehensive set of international institutions but they are rather weak and in need of reform. Liberal values are nominally endorsed by most states but they are in internal conflict and make up no firm basis for a stable world order. We live in a liberal world order, but it is not nearly as peaceful, cooperative and converging as liberals have predicted it would be. R2P France 42, 60, 165, 166, 169, 195 Fukuyama, Francis 1, 9, 185, 197 Vico, Giambattista 15 Vietnam 43, 66, 122, 124 
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